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Two Strategies for Defending Naturalism
Against C. S. Lewis’s and Victor Reppert’s
Argument From Reason
by Louis J. Swingrover
Louis J. Swingrover is currently completing his M.A. in
philosophy from Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington,
after which he will be pursuing doctoral work. His research
interests lie in philosophy of religion and philosophy of science.

Just what positions or actions the Argument From Reason (AFR)
justifies one to adopt or perform remains hotly disputed. In this paper
I introduce the argument and note some concerns, using the second
edition of Lewis’s Miracles and Victor Reppert’s development in C.
S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea. I then sketch out two strategies by which
naturalists might be able to defend their position. In the first strategy
Naturalism is assumed for the sake of argument and a dilemma is
posed, neither horn of which favors Supernaturalism. In the second
strategy proponents of the AFR are accused of committing the
genetic fallacy. I consider whether Lewis’s argument might dodge this
accusation if it is read as a de jure challenge to Naturalism. I draw on
Plantinga’s early account of warrant and put his rebuttal to Freud and
Marx in Warranted Christian Belief to work against the AFR. After
these two strategies are introduced I conclude that while the AFR
does not defeat Naturalism simpliciter, it calls attention to the deep
rift between natural and supernatural worldviews and sheds light on
the supernatural assumptions that underlie much of Western thought.

1. Introduction

The earliest piece of philosophical writing ever published by
Elizabeth (“G. E. M.”) Anscombe was her critical response to C.
S. Lewis’s argument that Naturalism is self-contradictory. Lewis’s
argument was originally published in the third chapter of the first
edition of Miracles, in 1947. After his scholarly interaction with
Anscombe at the Oxford Socratic club on February 2nd, 1948, Lewis
invested time into revising his material. He then downgraded his
charge against Naturalism from “self-contradictory,” indicating that
he appreciated the force of Anscombe’s concerns.1 According to the
1
Although he maintains that .”..a strict materialism refutes itself. . .” (p.
314, emphasis mine).
z
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post-Anscombe editions of Miracles, rather than revealing naturalism
as a self-contradiction, reason is responsible for the “cardinal difficulty”
facing the naturalist.
Reppert’s discussion of the varieties of Materialism and Naturalism
is quite helpful; he provides a tidy demarcation of the Naturalism in
Lewis’s crosshairs: “Any genuinely naturalistic position requires that
all instances of explanation in terms of reasons be further explained in
terms of a nonpurposive substratum” (51). I will refer to Lewis’s and
Reppert’s alternative metaphysics as “Supernaturalism” which posits
the existence of fundamental (“ground floor”) explanations that are
essentially purposive. The sense of “purposive” here is quite strong.
Reppert, with help from Dennet, lays out a naturalistic account of
“purpose” according to which the purpose of a heart is to pump blood.
The heart is structured in a manner that pumps blood and it acquired
that structure in order to pump blood. However such an account of
purpose is ultimately grounded in terms of nonpurposive phenomena,
namely blind evolutionary mechanisms. “This” explains Reppert “is
the exact opposite of what we find in theism, where the apparently
nonpurposive order of the physical world is explainable in terms of the
intentions and purposes of God” (49).
Specifically what premises the Argument From Reason (AFR)
reasons from and just what it attempts to establish require some
exposition. I will treat each in turn.

1.1. Lewis’s Grounds

Lewis’s text touches on several aspects of reason that pose
problems for Naturalism. For my part I am able to discern three: the
reality of the laws of logic, intentionality, and rational agency.

1.1.1. Logical L aws

According to Lewis, Naturalism has difficulty accounting for
the laws of logic, to which acts of reason make recourse. If there is
a way “things outside our own minds really ‘must’ be,” that is, if the
laws of logic are real, then they cannot belong to nature (313). This is
because such laws govern what “must be so always and in any possible
world” and not just our own (321). Logic is a part of that deeper magic
from before the dawn of time, for “from it the orderliness of Nature,
which alone enables us to know her, is derived” (320). If the laws of
logic are real, according to Lewis, they must be in an important sense
z
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prior to, outside, or above nature. At issue here are the nature and
reality of logical laws, which Lewis does not address at much depth.
It is also far from clear that realism about logical laws could not be at
home in a fundamentally nonpurposive (but not strictly materialistic)
worldview.2

1.1.2. Intentionality

Next, Naturalism faces difficulty in dealing with intentionality,
according to Lewis. He says “acts of thinking . . . are ‘about’
something other than themselves” (316). Yet essentially nonpurposive
organizations of material building blocks do not seem able to bear the
property of being about anything at all. Natural objects can certainly
bear other kinds of properties and stand in other kinds of relations,
from ‘distance from’ and ‘later than’ to ‘more numerous than’ and
‘greener than.’ However intentionality, or aboutness, is a kind-defining
property that can only be borne by the thought of a rational agent.3

1.1.3. R ational Agency

Finally, Naturalism has difficulty making room for rational
agency. When an agent reasons, according to Lewis, the agent freely
adopts a conclusion on the basis of the apprehension of its logical
grounding. However the naturalist must view every event in the
universe, including every belief and every behavior, as the inevitable4
result of non-conscious cause-effect relationships, which seems to
exclude any reasoning on the part of a rational agent. He asks “even
if grounds do exist, what exactly have they got to do with the actual
2 It is possible that the Naturalism Lewis has in mind here does not lend
itself to being quite so precisely defined as “nonpurposive.” He may have
been thinking somewhat Medievally here, subconsciously regarding ‘Nature’
as the concrete, sublunary sphere and what belongs to it or is associated with
it.
3 One might wonder about utterances and inscriptions. Are these very
sentences not about anything? First, if any such strings were to occur as the
result of non-mental forces they would not be about anything. Second, even
if some such strings are the deliberate results of rational agents, they may
not really be about anything in themselves. They may be regarded as nonintentional instruments by which rational agents signal their thoughts to one
another. Third, if these strings are in any way about anything in themselves
their intentional states must be entirely dependent on, or derivative of, the
intentional states of the rational agents who generate them.
4
or, at best, random
z
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occurrence of the belief as a psychological event?” (315). The majority
of Lewis’s text is spent on the nature of rational agency and the
difficulty it poses for Naturalism.
This aspect of the argument is contingent on two controversial
positions that proponents would do well to develop. If cause-effect
explanations preclude rational explanations, then ipso facto rationality
is conditioned by free will. Lewis seems to acknowledge this at times,
e.g. when he writes that “the human mind . . . is set free, in the measure
required, from the huge nexus of non-rational causation. . .” (Miracles
320). However not only is this libertarianism with respect to human
freedom controversial in its own right, this account of rationality
amounts to a variety of epistemic voluntarism, for it requires agents
to freely adopt new beliefs to be rational. The nature and degree of
the freedom one has over one’s own beliefs is not at all obvious. It
should also be noted here that this view creates prima facie tension
with Reppert’s argument from mental causation (discussed in § 1.2.2).

1.2. R eppert ’s Grounds

Lewis provides Reppert with material for an array of subtly
distinct arguments, of which the closest to Lewis’s argument from
rational agency is an argument from the reliability of our cognitive
faculties (discussed in § 1.2.5). Reppert begins by picking up and
developing the argument from intentionality (74 ff.), and then lays out
five additional arguments.

1.2.1. Truth States

Drawing additionally on Lewis, Reppert lays out an argument
from truth (76 ff.). Just as it makes no sense to say of a natural organism
that it is about something else, it makes no sense to say of any natural
organism that it is true of something else. According to Reppert the
reality of rational inference implies the existence of truth states, which
he takes to be inconsistent with Naturalism.

1.2.2. Mental Causation

Next Reppert lays out an argument from the reality of the mental
causation operant in rational inference. When a rational inference is
made, an agent considers and accepts one premise, and then another,
and then adopts a conclusion as a result of the previous mental states.
Not only that, but one “mental event must cause another mental event
z
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in virtue of the propositional content of those events” (78 ff.). For
Reppert to be consistent with Lewis, the sense of causation intended
here must not be deterministic; if it were then by Lewis’s standards
the move from one mental event to the next would not be rational.
However if a person achieves insight that permits the deliberate
movement from one mental state to the next, then inference can be
both Lewis-rational and Naturalism-inconsistent.
Note however that this account of inference limits the
usefulness of the AFR. As an example, it would be inconsistent with
epiphenomenalism. According to the epiphenomenalist, mental states
are sufficiently and exclusively determined by physical states and,
more relevantly, never the other way around. This would mean that
mental states would not have causal access to one another the way they
would on the Lewisian/Reppertian account of inference. Convinced
epiphenomenalists will therefore have to look elsewhere for arguments
against Naturalism.

1.2.3. Psychological R elevance of Logical L aws

Reppert then lays out an argument from the psychological
relevance of the laws of logic (81 ff.). Not only is their existence
inconsistent with Naturalism, as discussed above, but the act of rational
inference requires that logical laws be psychologically relevant. In
order to come to a conclusion from the premises that logically imply it
a rational agent must make conscious recourse to the applicable laws.
This activity is inconsistent with Naturalism, according to Reppert,
because on Naturalism insight into the laws of logic would require the
brain to stand in physical relations to the laws of logic, which are not
physical.5

1.2.4. Unity of Consciousness

After this Reppert lays out an argument from the unity and
endurance of consciousness through rational inference (82 ff.). To
make an inference one must be aware of each of the premises and
their logical relations and then proceed to draw a conclusion from
them. This requires that there be some one thing with continuity
5 This argument is reminiscent of the mind/body problem consistently
raised in objection to Interactionist Dualism. Interactionists propounding
this argument must therefore explain why relations between non-physical
and physical things are a problem in one case but not the other.
z
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of consciousness, a “metaphysical unit, not merely a functional unit
deemed a ‘system’ by an arbitrary act of the mind,” for which Goetz
(1999) argues neuroscientists would not seek if it were not for our firstperson experience of ourselves.

1.2.5. R eliability of R ational Faculties

Finally, Reppert lays out an argument from the surprising
reliability of our rational faculties. Drawing on Plantinga and Nagel,
he argues that if Naturalism were true then our rational faculties would
not likely be reliable “indicators of the nonapparent character of the
world” (pp. 84 ff.). He then argues that our faculties are reliable and
therefore Naturalism is false by modus tollens.6 This argument could be
symbolized in the following way. Let N = Naturalism and R = Our
rational faculties reliably reveal the nonapparent features of the world.
			1. N → ¬R
			2. R

			3. ¬N

The plausibility with which one imbues the first premise should
depend on how convinced one is that natural-evolutionary mechanisms
do not promote the formation of true beliefs7. If one establishes
Naturalism with a high degree of certainty and one is convinced of the
sufficient reliability of our8 rational faculties one might modus ponens
one’s way to the conclusion that natural mechanisms must in fact
promote (or at least result in) as much. This could be accomplished by
showing the survival and reproductive advantages of true beliefs; or by
showing that the reliability of our cognitive faculties are “accidental”
byproducts of the promotion of traits that confer survival and
reproductive advantages, e.g. Gould and Lewontin’s case for biological
“spandrels.” Rebutting such objections requires one to shoulder quite
a heavy burden: to prove that natural mechanisms cannot or definitely
do not in fact result in rational faculties that are reliable in the relevant
sense.
A more troubling concern is that attempting to provide direct
support for (2) might be futile. Would it be possible to establish that
6
In Reppert’s explanation, and even in his list of premises, he uses
suitably modest terminology, while his conclusion is just that “Naturalism is
false.”
7 Or true beliefs especially or specifically about the nonapparent character
of the world, &c.
8
Or one’s own
z
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our “bare metal” cognitive faculties are reliable? Any reasoning one
employed would presume the reliability of such reasoning, which begs
the question at hand. Reppert seems to take (2) as a presupposition
of any putative inference so that any forward movement simply
requires its acceptance. However even if (2) is presupposed by any
act of inference, it is not obvious that this indicates its truth. What
reasons can one give that real inferences are ever truly drawn? Lewis
seems aware of this problem: “If . . . a proof that there are no proofs is
nonsensical, so is a proof that there are proofs” (319).
(1) also provides the basis for a slightly different argument
that Reppert never distinguishes from the one above, although the
general idea is discussed. It is also found in passages from Miracles and
Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Lies. All three argue that if our rational
faculties are not reliable then we cannot assert the truth of anything
we infer by them. Thus, if Naturalism is true, its truth may not be
rationally asserted (by hypothetical syllogism). One might symbolize
this in the following way, where A is a one-place predicate describing
a proposition that can be asserted rationally:
			4. N → ¬R

			5. ¬R → ¬AN

			6. N → ¬AN

This will be treated in more detail later. For now it should be
noted that the claim that if Naturalism is true then Naturalism cannot
be rationally asserted (N → ¬AN) is significantly weaker than the claim
that Naturalism is false (¬N).

1.3. The A im of the A rgument

Throughout Lewis’s and Reppert’s works there are thus quite
a number of grounds from which metaphysical, epistemological,
and practical implications are drawn. What is it exactly that these
arguments come to when all is said and done? The most ambitious
conclusion a proponent of the AFR could hope to establish is that
God exists, however Lewis and Reppert both seem aware that their
treatment of reason is insufficient to establish theism. Only slightly
less ambitious is this: Naturalism is false (a claim consistent with a
range of non-theistic worldviews). Less ambitious still is the claim
that Naturalism ought not be held (a kind of practical claim not
tightly bound to the matter of whether Naturalism is true), followed
by the claim that there are no epistemically respectable motivations for
z
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holding Naturalism (a claim only weaker than “Naturalism ought not
be held” because it is abstract rather than prescriptive and there might
be wiggle room for practical reason in between the two). Just down
from these are the claims that on Naturalism the truth of Naturalism
cannot be rationally asserted (which leaves room for non-rational but
somehow broadly epistemically respectable motivations for asserting
or at least privately maintaining Naturalism) and that there cannot
be rational arguments in support of Naturalism (which says nothing
about whether Naturalism can be rationally held or asserted). Finally,
the claims that theism can adequately ground the features of the
reasoning process under consideration while Naturalism cannot
(which leave open questions about the reality of these features) are
among the least ambitious claims worth arguing for.
Lewis and Reppert both seem to view discourse on the various
aspects of reason as a powerful contributor to a broader case for
theism. Lewis, “when he was persuaded by the argument [from
reason], accepted not theism (and certainly not Christianity) but rather
absolute idealism,” which is why “we find Lewis making independent
arguments against” non-theist worldviews once he accepts Christ
(Reppert, 103). Reppert’s own development of the argument is itself
aimed at providing motivations for “accepting a theistic understanding
of the universe as opposed to a naturalistic one” although he grants
that other “worldviews that make reason fundamental to what is real,
such as idealism and pantheism” are not defeated by the argument (72).
Nevertheless he notes that “for many people today, the live options are
some form of traditional theism on the one hand and some form of
naturalistic atheism on the other” (103).

2. Defensive Strategies for Naturalism

I will now turn to the task of sketching out two defensive
strategies available to the naturalist.

2.1. Strategy #1: Assume Naturalism and Pose a
Dilemma
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way:
anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as
nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up
beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder
after he has climbed up it.)
z
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(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)

Can the AFR precipitate a crisis for one who maintains
Naturalism? Lewis admits that Naturalism is not impossible. Not only
did he change the title of chapter 3 and rework the text to avoid making
an overbold claim, he includes clear admissions, e.g. “you can if you
wish regard all human ideals as illusions . . . without running into
self-contradiction and nonsense” (330). In this first strategy by which
I attempt to show the theoretical defensibility of Naturalism I argue
that Lewis’s “Dangerous Idea” does not deliver a motivation to the
convinced naturalist to adopt a supernaturalist worldview. I do this by
assuming Naturalism for the sake of argument and posing a dilemma
of practical reason, neither horn of which favors Supernaturalism.
Giving Lewis and Reppert the benefit of the doubt, bracket
any concerns with the AFR such as those raised in the introduction,
and grant the Dangerous Idea. Let R’ = There is an adequate ground
of the laws of logic, intentionality, truth states, mental causation,
the psychological relevance of the laws of logic, and the unity and
continuity of consciousness. Then let the Dangerous Idea (D) = N →
¬R’ and the “Extended Idea” (E) be that if R’ is false, then nothing
can be rationally asserted. One could symbolize this as follows:
7. N			p

		8. N → ¬R’		

D

		9. ¬R’ → (∀x)(¬Ax)

E

		10. N → (∀x)(¬Ax)

8, 9, HS

		11. (∀x)(¬Ax)		

7, 10, MP

In (7) Naturalism is adopted as a premise for the sake of argument.
Premise (8) symbolizes the Dangerous Idea, that if Naturalism
is right then there cannot be any reason, that is, there are no adequate
grounds for the laws of logic, intentionality, truth states, mental
causation, the psychological relevance of the laws of logic, and the
unity and continuity of consciousness.
Premise (9) symbolizes the Extended Idea, that if there is no
reason, then for any proposition x, x cannot be asserted rationally.
(10) says that if Naturalism is true then for any proposition x,
x cannot be asserted rationally. This follows from (8) and (9) by
hypothetical syllogism.
(11) says (without condition) that for any proposition x, x cannot
be asserted rationally. This follows from (7) and (10) by modus ponens.
z
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Lewis and Reppert should agree up to this point and, as discussed
earlier, want the naturalist to draw the conclusion that Naturalism
cannot be rationally asserted:
		

12. ¬AN

11, UI

		

13. ¬AD

11, UI

This does indeed follow—from (11) by universal instantiation.
However this formulation of the argument reveals its transcendental
nature. One may also conclude:
This says that Lewis’s Dangerous Idea cannot be rationally asserted.
But if D cannot be rationally asserted, then nothing premised on it can
be rationally asserted either. To proceed down steps (7) through (13) is
to descend9 a Wittgensteinian ladder from Naturalism into Cognitive
Nihilism.
This results in a condition in which reason might not have the
character that one once thought. How now shall one proceed? Once
one abandons the use of pure reason, one faces a dilemma of practical
reason: Either one does not trust the deliverances of one’s cognitive
faculties or one does trust them, fully admitting that reason is an ignis
fatuus.
If one grasps the first horn of the dilemma and does not trust the
deliverances of one’s cognitive faculties, then one is just as prohibited
from allowing D or ¬N to inform belief and behavior as one is N or any
other proposition, resulting in Pyrrhonian Skepticism.
If instead one grasps the second horn of the dilemma and decides
to trust the deliverances of one’s cognitive faculties as a matter of
practice, then one is just as free to assert N as one is ¬N (granting that
no assertions are, technically speaking, “rational”). It then becomes a
matter of evaluating the evidence for and against each, and no unique
motivation is delivered to the naturalist for abandoning Naturalism.
A possible way through the horns of the dilemma may be what
Lewis (Miracles, 320) describes as a “humbler position,” according
to which one trusts the deliverances of one’s cognitive faculties for
practical purposes such as setting bones, building bridges, and
launching Sputniks while distrusting them when it comes to speculative
philosophy. He says that this position would keep one from affirming
Naturalism, as it is “a prime specimen of that towering speculation,
discovered from practice and going far beyond experience, which is
now being condemned.” At best, however, winning this case would
mean that both Naturalism and Supernaturalism lie beyond what one
9

After all, one can hardly call this ascending.
z

178  z

Proceedings from the Francis White Ewbank Colloquium
could evaluate. This would result in naught but a Pyrrhic victory for
the proponent of the AFR.

2.2. Strategy #2: Accuse Proponents of the Genetic
Fallacy

Ceteris paribus any argument for ¬N from the premise that if N
then N is believed as a result of cause-effect relationships, is guilty of
the genetic fallacy (albeit a subtle one). Anscombe (227) is onto this:
Whether [one’s] conclusions are rational or irrational is
settled by considering the chain of reasoning that [one] gives
and whether [one’s] conclusions follow from it. When we
are giving a causal account of this thought, e.g. an account
of the physiological processes which issue in the utterance of
his reasoning, we are not considering his utterances from the
point of view of evidence, reasoning, valid argument, truth,
at all; we are considering them merely as events. Just because
that is how we are considering them, our description has in
itself no bearing on the question of ‘valid’, ‘invalid’, ‘rational’,
‘irrational’, and so on.”

Lewis’s and Reppert’s work does not engage with any argument in
favor of Naturalism: they neither reject a premise nor identify a fallacy.
Do they commit the genetic fallacy? Perhaps, as suggested in § 1.3,
rather than arguing for ¬N, the proponent of the AFR can argue that
N ought not be believed. Plantinga (2000) calls this kind of objection a
de jure challenge, as opposed to a de facto challenge. A de jure challenge
claims that a belief is “is irrational or unreasonable or unjustified or
in some other way properly subject to invidious epistemic criticism;
it contrasts with the de facto challenge, according to which the belief
in question is false” (p. 167). A de jure challenge goes beyond merely
accusing a belief of not being rationally assertable. As discussed above,
a belief admitted not to be rationally assertable might nevertheless be
held on the basis of some other broadly epistemically or practically
permissible grounds, or one might take an agnostic stance toward
the proposition if one judges it to be a member a special class that
lacks rational assertability. A de jure challenge to a position goes so
far as to characterize it as having a special quality that commends the
withholding or withdrawal of belief.
One can give a plausible reading of Lewis that takes him to be
advancing a de jure challenge to Naturalism. This is perhaps easiest to
do while reading chapter 5 of Miracles, where Lewis argues that there
z
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is a broad consensus an “individual’s views are worthless if they can
be fully accounted for by some non-moral and non-rational cause” (p.
331). He takes Freud, Marx, and basically everyone in the world to
be at least implicitly committed to this principle, that a naturalistic
account of a belief undermines its epistemic and practical credibility.
However Plantinga, while he does not name Lewis as his
opponent, opposes this principle. He argues that “giving a naturalistic
account of a kind of belief isn’t automatically a criticism of that kind
of belief ” (p. 145). He then provides more nuanced interpretations of
Freud and Marx by which Freud (anticipated by Hume) accounts for
religious belief by attributing it to a psychological coping mechanism
present in human beings called “wish-fulfillment” whose proper
function promotes human flourishing but not true belief; in fact it
produces delusions. Marx’s account (anticipated by Rousseau) attributes
it to a perverted social order that causes cognitive dysfunction.
Plantinga characterizes the “F&M” complaint as being concerned
with what he calls “warrant,” which refers to that which differentiates
true belief from knowledge, so that knowledge is warranted true
belief. In this text Plantinga develops an account of warrant according
to which one is warranted in believing something if it is the result of
properly functioning faculties that are designed to produce true beliefs
in the relevant context.
Freud characterizes religious belief as lacking warrant on the
grounds that it is the result of properly functioning faculties that
are not designed to promote true belief while Marx characterizes it
as lacking warrant on the grounds that it is the result of improperly
functioning faculties. Both criticisms take aim at specific conditions
for warrant, and neither criticism springs from a naturalistic account
of the beliefs they attack.
Lewis and Reppert, however, fail to show that belief in
Naturalism lacks warrant. They do not even attempt to argue that
belief in Naturalism is the result of improper function, faculties whose
proper operation does not promote true belief, or faculties operating
outside the domain within which they were designed to function. Any
of those targets would have been fair game for a de jure challenge.
Nor would it be any easier of a case to make if they were to
argue that belief in Naturalism lacks warrant on the grounds that
if Naturalism were true then belief in it would be unwarranted. The
proponent of such a case would be saddled with a similar burden: to
establish that if Naturalism were true, then belief in Naturalism would
be the result of improper function, faculties whose proper operation
z
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does not promote true belief, or faculties operating outside the domain
within which they were designed to function.

3. Conclusion

The two defensive strategies sketched above interrelate. For
example if a proponent of the AFR were to counter the second strategy
by showing that if Naturalism were true then belief in Naturalism
would be unwarranted, this would not on its own commend one to
withhold or withdraw belief in Naturalism. The first strategy would
kick in: So long as Naturalism remains possible (as Lewis himself
grants, post-Anscombe), no motivation is delivered to the Naturalist
for abandoning Naturalism in favor of Supernaturalism; the Naturalist
is simply left with Cognitive Nihilism at the level of pure reason, and
a dichotomy of practical reason according to which cognitive faculties
are simply either trusted or mistrusted.
Naturalism, however, is revealed by the AFR to come with a
very high philosophical price tag. While the proponent of the AFR
only needs one variant of the argument to succeed, the naturalist must
eliminate or propose dim naturalistic shadows of every aspect of reason
discussed by Lewis and Reppert. Furthermore these alternatives
must each be held with a very high degree of credence to prevent the
probability of Naturalism from dwindling.10 Perhaps Lewis is right
to name reason as the “cardinal difficulty” facing the naturalist. To
be sure, many of these individual projects have been undertaken, as
Reppert acknowledges, with varying degrees of sophistication and
success, in movements including atheistic Existentialism, Naturalized
Epistemology, Perdurantism, Neurophilosophy, etc. However while
some rare naturalists, such as Rosenberg, are well aware of the full
scope of the impact of Naturalism on one’s worldview, most, including
Dawkins, do not seem to realize it. Dawkins only comes to terms with
the bleak implications of Naturalism in specific dialectical contexts
where he finally admits, for example, there is “at bottom, no design, no
purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference” (p. 85). He
otherwise writes and even quite vigorously argues as if reason is real,
10 Even if a naturalist is 90% certain that each of the eight arguments
laid out in the introduction fail, the otherwise-unadjusted probability
of Naturalism for that person dwindles to 43% (.98). For the unadjusted
probability of Naturalism to exceed that of Supernaturalism, an agent
must be, on average, >91.70% certain that each of the variants of the AFR
introduced fail (8√.5).
z
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life has meaning, and objective moral values and duties really exist.
Meanwhile the vast majority of Westerners seem to be (reflective
or unreflective) realists at heart when it comes to logic and reason
and morality and truth and souls and free will. Western legislation,
customs, and languages all carry connotations only intuitively
supportable by a supernaturalist foundation. The Argument From
Reason is good for bringing this to light.

z
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